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For the people of Fiji, the year 2000
was the most turbulent and traumatic
in recent memory. The country
endured an armed takeover of parlia-
ment and a hostage crisis lasting fifty-
six days, the declaration of martial
law and abrogation of the 1997 con-
stitution, and a bloody mutiny in the
armed forces. These events raised the
specter of civil war and economic col-
lapse, international ostracism, and a
future plagued with uncertainty and
h a rdship. Comparisons with the coups
of 1987 were inevitable, but most
observers would conclude that the
crisis of 2000 left Fiji more adrift 
and divided than ever before.
The month of May has become
synonymous with coups in Fiji. It 
was on 1 4 May 198 7 the country wit-
nessed its first military coup d’état, l e d
by then Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni
Rabuka. On 19 May 2 0 0 0 a group of
nine gunmen attempted to repeat his-
t o ry, by taking hostage Prime Minister
Mahendra Chaudhry and his People’s
Coalition government. While the pre-
cise details of who was involved and
how the takeover was to be executed
a re still to be revealed, the gunmen
who stormed parliament were no
doubt banking on the support of
various antigovernment forces to
e n s u re they carried the day.
The campaign to oust Mahendra
Chaudhry from office, which began
covertly soon after the historic elec-
tion of May 1999, became more overt
in the early months of 2000. Fijian
political parties, led by the former
governing party, Soqosoqo ni Vakavu-
lewa ni Taukei (sv t), held meetings
around the country to discuss ways to
oppose if not depose the government
and thereby return to power. These
meetings helped fuel indigenous Fijian
unease and animosity toward Chaud-
hry’s leadership. Signaling its move
toward a more nationalist stance, the
sv t terminated its coalition with the
Indo-Fijian–based National Federa-
tion Party in February, describing the
coalition as “self-defeating.”
In March, the Taukei Movement
was revived with the aim, according
to spokesman Apisai Tora, of “re m o v-
ing the government through various
legal means as soon as possible” (Sun,
3 May 2000, 1). In 1987 the Taukei
Movement had spearheaded national-
ist opposition to, and destabilization
of, the then Labor Coalition govern-
ment. In 2000, the movement’s battle
cry was familiar: the People’s Coali-
tion government was not working in
the interests of the indigenous people.
Tora’s role in the Taukei Move-
ment was a dramatic turnabout from
his 1999 position, when he led one of
the Labor Party’s coalition partners,
the Party of National Unity (pa n u).
Tora lost his bid for a seat in parlia-
ment, and subsequently blamed his
defeat on Chaudhry’s decision to field
a Labor candidate against him. In
January he announced his resignation
as pa n u secretary. This followed an
unsuccessful attempt in September
1999 to pull the party out of the
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coalition, a move that was rebuffed
by pa n u’s four parliamentarians. 
Splits deepened within all the
Fijian-based parties in the People’s
Coalition, and between those parlia-
mentarians and cabinet ministers loyal
to Chaudhry and those opposed to his
leadership. Labor’s relations with its
principal coalition partner, the Fijian
Association Party (fap), became espe-
cially fraught. With the deputy prime
minister and fa p leader, Adi Kuini
Speed, away on medical leave, the
party leadership was taken over by
backbencher Ratu Tu‘akitau Coka-
nauto, a vocal critic of Chaudhry. In
April a special general meeting of the
fa p endorsed its withdrawal from 
the People’s Coalition, but this was
decided in the absence of the party’s
four cabinet ministers. 
Anti-Labor and anti-Chaudhry sen-
timent was fueled by a number of
contentious policy initiatives taken by
the government. These included the
Constitutional Amendment Bill,
introduced in the House of Represen-
tatives in February. It proposed fifteen
changes to the constitution, some of
which the sv t had put forward when
it was in power. Fijian critics claimed
that the bill would dilute the power of
the Senate and by implication that of
the Great Council of Chiefs, as well
as weaken other Fijian institutions,
particularly in respect to advising the
president. On the other hand, the bill
alienated human rights and civil soci-
ety groups by its attempt to remove
constitutional provisions prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. 
Also controversial was the govern-
ment’s Social Justice and Affirmative
Action Bill. Among other things it
proposed that assistance programs
previously limited to indigenous
Fijians and Rotumans (such as Fijian
Development Bank loans) be opened
up to other races. Despite advice even
from some allies, the government per-
sisted with the proposed legislation.
Leading the opposition to the bill was
Senator Laisenia Qarase, a nominee
of the Great Council of Chiefs in the
Senate. His argument, which echoed
that of other critics, was that remov-
ing special assistance for Fijians in
commerce and industry, aimed at
closing the gaps between the races,
would lead to ethnic tensions and
political instability. He labeled the
government’s approach “arrogant,
belligerent and provocative” (Sun, 14
Mar 2000, 3). This led to a highly
public feud, conducted through news-
paper advertisements, between Qarase
and the government, with the latter
accusing Qarase of “running an
orchestrated propaganda campaign to
discredit the government based on lies
and distortion” (Review, April, 17). 
Perhaps most sensitive of all, how-
ever, was the government’s land pol-
icy. The stand-off between the gov-
ernment and the Native Land Trust
Board (n lt b) on the future of land
leases continued into 2000. The
urgency of resolving this issue was
underscored by a report that up to 95
percent of cane leases, due to expire
before 2002, would not be renewed
(Sun, 16 Mar 2000, 1). Chaudhry’s
determination to retain the Agricul-
ture Landlord and Tenant Act (alta)
provided potent ammunition to his
critics, eager to read in his actions a
bias toward the interests of Indo-
Fijian farmers. One newly formed
organization, the Foundation of the
Indigenous Fijian People, under the
leadership of Rewa parliamentarian
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Ratu Timoci Silatolu, warned non-
indigenous Fijian leaders to refrain
from commenting on alta. Another
Chaudhry opponent, nltb General
Manager Maika Qarikau, was report-
edly busy meeting provincial councils
around the country, feeding antigov-
ernment sentiment over land issues.
A key platform of the government’s
land policy was the proposal to set up
a Land Use Commission. According
to Chaudhry, the proposal aimed to
deal with the problem of unused land.
“The land can be developed and used
to obtain a return for those who own
it” (Times, 8 Mar 2000, 1). Critics,
including Vice President Ratu Josefa
Iloilo, described the proposal as an
attempt to impose state control over
land use, thus denying landowners
their rightful ownership. A govern-
ment-sponsored visit to Malaysia by
ten chiefs, to observe land use policy
there, was labeled “a ploy” to further
divide the Fijian people. 
Land issues gained greater political
salience due to the potentially huge
returns that would be realized from
the country’s vast mahogany planta-
tions. In March it was announced that
the Commonwealth Development
Corporation (c d c) was the govern-
ment’s preferred strategic partner in
the harvesting, processing, and mar-
keting of the resource. The former
chairman of Fiji Hardwoods (a com-
pany formed in 1997 to manage the
plantations), George Speight, had been
sacked from his position soon after
the 1999 election by Agriculture Min-
ister Poseci Bune. There were allega-
tions of conflict of interest due to
Speight’s close association with a rival
to the c dc—the US-based Anglo-
Pacific Corporation (Sun, 9 Apr 2000,
15–17). Opposition members of par-
liament condemned the government’s
choice of c d c, saying it showed that
Fijians “have no voice in deciding
how their resources will be used”
(Post, 8 Apr 2000, 2). In April the
Great Council of Chiefs requested
that the government defer any further
decisions on the mahogany question,
forming a committee to look into
how landowners would benefit from
the resource. This was chaired by
Senator Qarase. 
Fijian mistrust of the government
was also stirred by the parliamentary
majority it enjoyed. svt’s president
and former deputy prime minister,
Taufa Vakatale, claimed that the gov-
ernment had such an overwhelming
majority that the sv t was powerless
in opposition. Labor held 37 seats in
the 71-seat parliament, but the total
number for the Coalition was 58 seats
(including the 3 Christian Democratic
Alliance members and 3 indepen-
dents). According to Vakatale, the
only option for the people was to 
take to the streets. 
In April a series of antigovernment
marches began. The first, in Lautoka,
attracted only about five hundred
demonstrators. At the next march in
Suva on 28 April, there were an esti-
mated four thousand, led by promi-
nent Fijian politicians and members 
of parliament. They called for the
removal of the “anti-Fijian” govern-
ment and for its replacement by an
indigenous-based government. The
demonstrators also called for the
1997 constitution to be replaced by
the 1990 constitution. The govern-
ment’s response was to publish full-
page advertisements in the daily
papers listing all its initiatives to assist
indigenous Fijians. When Police Com-
missioner Isikia Savua warned that the
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police would not be able to control
future protests, the home affairs min-
ister ordered police not to issue any
new permits. This move was over-
turned by the prime minister, but not
b e f o re Fijian politicians thre a t e n e d “ t o
take the law into their own hands”
(Times, 6 May 2000, 1). Another
march was planned for 19 May.
By May there was growing specu-
lation of another coup, with commen-
tators likening the political situation
to the lead-up to the coup of May
1987. Army Commander Frank Baini-
marama “categorically” denounced
such speculation, stating that “the
military will not be used in any way
to promote the downfall of any legiti-
mate government” (Post, 9 Apr 2000,
1). However, media speculation
pointed to the more likely possibility
of an elite “civilian” coup rather than
a 1 9 8 7-style coup (R e v i e w, M a y 2 0 0 0;
Post, 15 May 2000, 4). While the
government could not ignore such
speculation, it did not appear too dis-
turbed. In a mild rebuke to his oppo-
sition, Chaudhry remarked, “I hope
the people engaged in such disruptive
activities will realize that they are
doing greater harm to Fiji” (Post, 
18 May 2000, 1). 
Taukei Movement anger was also
directed at President Ratu Sir Kami-
sese Mara. The movement’s leader,
Apisai Tora, castigated the president
for not responding directly to a peti-
tion calling on him to dismiss the
Chaudhry government, appoint an
interim government, amend the 1997
constitution, and call new elections.
The president’s response had been
channeled through the media, where
his officials had pointed out that he
did not have the power to dismiss a
democratically elected government 
or to appoint an interim government
(Post, 6 May 2000, 1). The first
anniversary of the People’s Coalition
Government occurred on Friday 19
May. The government celebrated with
a special morning tea in their parlia-
mentary offices. As parliament
resumed its sitting that morning,
about two thousand protesters gath-
ered in downtown Suva to demon-
strate once again their opposition to
the Chaudhry government. Mean-
while a small group of armed men,
wearing civilian clothes, made their
way to parliament in two vehicles. At
about 10:30 a m they burst into the
parliamentary chamber, handcuffing
government members and taking
them prisoner. On hearing of the
armed hold-up, the antigovernment
demonstrators marched to the gates
of parliament, where they formed a
human shield. Later that morning
rioting broke out in Suva. Looting
and arson continued unchecked for
the remainder of the day.
The spokesman for the armed
g roup soon revealed himself as Georg e
Speight, the former head of Fiji Hard-
woods. He announced that a “civilian
coup” had taken place, carried out by
“soldiers of the vanua” on behalf of
the indigenous people, and that as a
result the constitution was suspended
as were the powers of the president.
Appearing at his side (and named as
the interim prime minister) was fa p
parliamentarian, Timoci Silatolu. Also
prominent in early negotiations with
Speight’s group were sv t leader Ratu
Inoke Kubuabola, acting fa p leader
Ratu Tu‘akitau, and former prime
minister and current chairman of the
Great Council of Chiefs Sitiveni
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Rabuka. When asked by the media
whether he supported the takeover,
Kubuabola declined to comment and
instead called for calm. The situation
was confused further when neither the
army nor the police appeared willing
to stop the looting on the streets of
Suva. While an announcement from
the military headquarters indicated
that the army did not accept the
takeover and continued to recognize
Chaudhry as prime minister, the army
also claimed to be awaiting instruc-
tions from the Ministry of Home
Affairs. But Home Affairs in turn
claimed to be awaiting word from the
new “interim Home Affairs minister,”
named as Raquita Valalalabure.
A semblance of authority was
finally imposed when President Ratu
Mara spoke to the nation later that
day and announced a state of emer-
gency. He described the takeover bid
as unlawful and pledged to do his
utmost to resolve the situation. This
included addressing the issues that had
caused the unrest (namely indigenous
Fijian concerns). He called for the
release of all captives and for the per-
petrators to “disband.” In response to
the declaration of the state of emer-
gency, the army deployed two battal-
ions to assist police in restoring law
and order, but not within the parlia-
ment building, where the hostage-
takers remained. 
Shortly after that address, Speight
also gave a press conference where he
declared himself head of state and
announced that decrees would be
drafted to establish the “legal frame-
work” for his government. He
claimed to have the support of all
Fijian political parties as well as the
police and army. However media
reports described Speight as an
“undischarged bankrupt and failed
businessman,” who had appeared
before the High Court four days ear-
lier on charges of extortion. Mean-
while, Rabuka was reported to be
attempting to broker a settlement,
meeting with Speight, Ratu Mara, 
and the captive government. Speight
described Rabuka as acting in his per-
sonal capacity and not as the chair-
man of the Great Council of Chiefs
(g c c), which he claimed no longer
existed. At the same time, Speight
reiterated that he was acting on a
mandate from the indigenous people
that “went beyond legal technicali-
ties.” He challenged overseas govern-
ments to recognize his legitimacy and
he confidently predicted that his
“interim government” would be up
and running by Monday.
So ended one of the most bizarre
and shocking days in Fiji’s modern
history. It was also the beginning of a
ten-day stand-off between the hostage-
takers in parliament (soon to be
labeled the George Speight Group)
and the president. While the more
militant nationalist leaders as well as
some prominent chiefs aligned them-
selves with the Speight group, other
Fijian politicians appeared to waver
and wait on the sidelines. With Ratu
Mara standing firm against the group,
a propaganda campaign was launched
by Speight supporters aimed at dis-
crediting the president. Meanwhile
out in the farmlands of Naitasiri and
Tailevu, another campaign was con-
ducted, aimed at terrorizing Indo-
Fijian residents and driving them from
their homes. In the western provinces
of Vitilevu, Fijian opposition to the
takeover led to threats of economic
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sabotage but also to calls for a sepa-
rate western government. A meeting
of the Great Council of Chiefs was
convened to discuss the crisis and
mobilize support for the pre s i d e n t . B u t
its deliberations were marred by deep-
ening rivalries and divisions within
the chiefly establishment. The resolu-
tion adopted at the end of three days
was a vain attempt to give the Speight
group most of what it wanted (par-
don, interim government, review of
the 1997 constitution) while retaining
Ratu Mara as head of state. Not sur-
prisingly the resolution was rejected
by the Speight group, and Ratu Mara
instead prorogued parliament and
moved to set up an interim council of
advisers with full executive powers.
With tensions deepening and ugly
scenes of violence erupting around
parliament and in downtown Suva,
the army leadership made its move. 
A group led by Commander Frank
Bainimarama met the president on the
afternoon of 29 May and presented
him with a traditional isevusevu, fol-
lowed by a request that Ratu Mara
“stand aside” and allow the military
to assume control. This was report-
edly in the interests of “national secu-
rity” as well as to ensure the presi-
dent’s safety. Later that night, Ratu
Mara and some members of his fam-
ily were spirited aboard a naval vessel
that took them to Mara’s chiefly
island of Lakeba. The army comman-
der then declared martial law, a devel-
opment broadly welcomed by the Fiji
public as a last resort against anarchy
and civil war.
Thus the first episode in Fiji’s polit-
ical crisis ended, and another began.
In what appeared to be an attempt 
to “neutralize” the demands of the
Speight group, the first action of the
military was to issue a decree that
abrogated the 1997 constitution. It
also planned a decree granting
amnesty to the Speight group once 
the hostages were released. An interim
military government was set up, with
Bainimarama as head of an executive
council, initially planning to rule for
six months then hand over to a civil-
ian government. An impasse soon
developed, however, over the Speight
group’s demand that their Taukei
Civilian Government be set up imme-
diately with Bau High Chief Ratu
Jope Seniloli as president. The army
commander’s view was that none of
the group had the credibility or the
competence to be included in the
civilian government. He also rejected
their demand that the Great Council
of Chiefs be reconvened to appoint a
new president. “The military main-
tains its stance that we must secure
the release of all hostages and return
of all arms and other military stores
before anything else is done. The g c c
will be convened when we are assured
of the peace and stability of the
nation” (government press release, 
4 June 2000).
Negotiations toward a “peaceful”
end to the crisis dragged on through
most of June and into July. During
this time the government of Mahen-
dra Chaudhry continued to be held
hostage, while around them the
grounds of parliament became the
campsite (and at times fairground) for
hundreds of Speight supporters. Many
were from the villages of Tailevu
(Speight’s province) and Naitasiri.
The armed men who had originally
stormed parliament were identified 
as soldiers from a special elite force
known as the First Meridian Squad-
ron and previously called the Counter
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Revolutionary Warfare (c rw) Unit,
set up by Rabuka after the coups of
1987 to deal with “terrorist” activi-
ties. They passed the time in parlia-
ment training “militia units” made up
of young men and boys. While mostly
confined to the grounds of parlia-
ment, the more unruly elements also
engaged in criminal acts of arson,
theft, and assault in the surrounding
neighborhood, causing many residents
to flee their homes. The army main-
tained a watchful, though mainly pas-
sive, role on the streets, except when
provoked into occasional skirmishes
with the “rebels.”
The stance adopted by the interna-
tional community was one of cautious
support for the efforts of the military
to end the crisis, but at the same time
unequivocal condemnation of the
Speight group. Calls were made for a
speedy return to democratic govern-
ment, but trade and aid sanctions
were not imposed as long as the
hostage drama continued. At the end
of June an agreement was reached
between trade unions, employers, the
military, and civil society groups to
end union bans on Fiji. The crux of
the agreement was that a constitu-
tional resolution to the crisis should
be pursued. Meanwhile an economic
crisis was developing, with mounting
job losses (many in the tourism sec-
tor), falling government revenue, and
massive pay cuts. The Finance Min-
istry predicted that Fiji would experi-
ence negative 15 percent growth for
the year, with a government deficit of
9 percent gross domestic product. (A
20 percent pay cut for civil servants
was announced and later lowered to
12.5 percent). 
In an effort to pressure the Speight
group to end the occupation of parlia-
ment and release the hostages, the
army commander on 4 July swore in
an Interim Civilian Government,
headed by former banker and Senator
Laisenia Qarase. Comprising promi-
nent Fijian technocrats and profes-
sionals, its task was to halt the slide
in the economy as well as to address
indigenous interests and concerns.
The announcement of the interim
government was described by Speight
as “an affront to the objective of the
coup and to the aspirations of the
vanua,” and he dismissed the line-up
as mainly “Mara’s men” (Times, 4
July 2000, 3). In the following days
the crisis escalated. A g roup of Speight
supporters seized control of the coun-
try’s main power station in central
Vitilevu, shutting down power sup-
plies to most of the island. In the
northern town of Labasa, mutineers
took control of the army barracks,
backed by chiefs supporting Speight.
The unrest spread to other parts of
the country, with roadblocks erected,
police stations occupied, and resorts
and factories seized and shut down.
At one major prison, inmates took
wardens hostage, and a number also
escaped. 
To stem the rapidly deteriorating
situation the military and the Speight
group reached an agreement on the
terms by which the hostages would 
be released and civilian government
restored. Signed on the night of 9 July
and known as the Muanikau Accord
(after the neighborhood where most
of the negotiations were held), it con-
tained a number of concessions by the
army. The most significant was an
undertaking to hand over power by
13 July to a president and vice presi-
dent to be appointed by the Great
Council of Chiefs. This would pave
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the way for the appointment of a new
interim civilian government and the
setting up of a constitution review
process. While the Speight group
undertook to release all hostages at
the time of the gcc meeting, as well
as to return all weapons to the army,
the military promised to promulgate 
a decree granting immunity for all
“political offences” committed
between 19 May and 13 July. The
two names that appeared to have the
endorsement of both sides were Vice
President Ratu Josefa Iloilo for presi-
dent, and Ratu Jope Seniloli for vice
president. George Speight was
reported to be “ecstatic” over the
outcome, describing it as a “great 
day for Fiji” (Post, 10 July 2000, 1). 
On the evening of 13 July (and
after the Great Council of Chiefs
elected Ratu Josefa and Ratu Jope as
president and vice president respec-
tively), the hostages were finally
released, ending fifty-six days in cap-
tivity. The Fiji Times editorialized,
“The former People’s Coalition Gov-
ernment has returned to a country
shaken and torn apart by events of
recent months” (14 July 2000, 6).
The international response was a mix-
ture of relief that the hostages were
free, and apprehension that Fiji was
heading down an unconstitutional
path. The end of the hostage drama
did not bring any immediate relief to
the country’s law-and-order problems,
which seemed only to be worsening.
With the swearing in of Ratu Josefa
as president on 18 July, a tense stand-
off developed between the military
and the Speight group over the posi-
tion of prime minister and the compo-
sition of the interim government. This
led to a delay in the announcement of
the cabinet line-up, with Ratu Iloilo
abdicating any responsibility for the
selection, leaving it to the military and
the Speight group to finalize. The mil-
itary’s preferred candidate for prime
minister was Qarase, while that of the
Speight group was Bau chief and Fiji’s
High Commissioner to Malaysia Adi
Samanunu Cakobau. (During this
period Qarase and his team continued
to govern in a caretaker capacity.)
The standoff ended dramatically on
the night of 2 7 J u l y, when Speight and
some of his advisers were arrested at
an army checkpoint, allegedly for
violating the curfew and for illegally
carrying arms. Early the next morn-
ing, the army stormed the school at
Kalabu village, on the outskirts of
Suva, where hundreds of Speight sup-
porters had relocated after vacating
the parliamentary compound. About
three hundred people were arrested,
including a number of the elite c rw
soldiers who had taken part in the
coup attempt. On 28 July, several
other Speight supporters were
arrested, including Timoci Silatolu,
and on 29 July the core members of
the group were transported to the
nearby island of Nukulau, declared a
prison zone by the military. It was
reported that treason charges against
the detainees would be investigated,
with the military claiming that Ratu
Iloilo’s life had been threatened (Post,
28 July 2000, 1). The army also
claimed that since the terms of the
Muanikau Accord had not been ful-
filled (namely return of all weapons
by the Speight group), immunity did
not apply.
With the arrest of the group, a new
episode in the crisis began. On 2 8 J u l y
the second interim administration was
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s w o rn in, made up of 2 0 ministers and
8 assistant ministers. Laisenia Qarase
retained his position as prime minis-
ter, and 13 members of his original
cabinet were also returned. Among
the new faces were sv t leader Kubua-
bola, Taukei Movement leader Tora,
and fa p faction leader Tu‘akitau,
politicians who had publicly sup-
ported the “indigenous cause” of the
Speight group, if not its “method.”
The “vigorous pursuit of indigenous
Fijian concerns” was made the central
objective of the Qarase administra-
tion, with policies to meet that goal
outlined in a Blueprint for the Protec-
tion of Fijian and Rotuman Rights,
initially unveiled on 13 J u l y. It covere d
the drafting of a new constitution,
land and resource issues (including
abolishing a lta), measures to
s t rengthen Fijian participation in com-
m e rce, review of the Fijian Adminis-
tration and the Great Council of
Chiefs, and affirmative action for
Fijians and Rotumans. The blueprint’s
adoption led many observers to con-
clude that the objectives of the Speight
group had been realized. 
In responding to the appointment
of the new administration, Labor
Party spokesman and deposed foreign
minister Tupeni Baba, said it was
unfortunate the president’s advisers
had not considered a government of
national unity. “The composition of
the (interim) government is discrimi-
natory and an open invitation for fur-
ther sanctions . . . .The government of
national unity as provided for in the
1997 constitution offers Fiji a legiti-
mate solution to the crisis” (Times, 29
July 2000, 2). Qarase, however, had
firmly turned his back on any “consti-
tutional” approach, asserting that the
reinstatement of the 1997 constitution
was “not realistic.” In order to have
“enduring peace and stability” in Fiji,
it was necessary to “look deeper into
the root causes of widespread Fijian
disaffection.” This required the
preparation of a new constitution to
address issues of importance to Fijians
and Rotumans, including their “col-
lective desire” that the positions of
head of state and head of government
always be held by them (Review, Aug
2000, 26–29).
The administration’s “road map”
for the return to constitutional gov-
ernment was to promulgate a new
constitution by August 2001 and to
hold elections a year later (by Sep-
tember 2002). However, Qarase was
unsuccessful in selling this plan to for-
eign governments. A meeting of the
Commonwealth Ministerial Action
Group, which closely monitored
developments in Fiji, described the
timetable as “inadequate in terms of
the need to promote reconciliation
and unity in Fiji” and reaffirmed its
support for the 1997 constitution
(Times, 19 Sept 2000, 5). The Euro-
pean Union also declared its dissatis-
faction with the situation and stated
that it retained the right “to use any
action or measure in response to vio-
lations of democracy” (P N B, Nov
2000, 13). The appointment of a con-
stitution review committee in October
did little to reassure or allay concerns.
Its chairman, Professor Asesela
Ravuvu, made clear his position that
“western concepts of democracy and
human rights” were a threat to indig-
enous values and institutions and
should be rejected. Not surprisingly
the committee’s public hearings, which
began in November, were largely boy-
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cotted by Indo-Fijians, as well as by
most mainstream political groups and
leaders. 
While the Qarase administration
drew its legitimacy from the upsurge
of indigenous Fijian nationalism gen-
erated by the events of 19 May, it also
sought to silence the most public pro-
tagonists of that uprising—the Speight
group. Part of its strategy for national
reconciliation and international reha-
bilitation depended on a full investi-
gation into, and the prosecution of,
those responsible for the coup
attempt. But this required a delicate
balancing act between bringing the
guilty to justice and not alienating too
many of the administration’s support-
ers. A number of prominent people
clearly owed their positions of power
to the events of 19 May, and some
were also under a cloud of suspicion
for their alleged involvement. They
included the vice president, several
ministers in the Interim Government,
some members of the constitution
review team and the police commis-
sioner. Investigating, let alone charg-
ing such individuals, would prove a
highly sensitive, if not impossible,
undertaking. 
On 16 August, Speight and sixteen
others were charged in the Magis-
trate’s Court with treason and various
related offenses. Over the next few
weeks more “rebels” were charged
with treason. Complicating the prose-
cution case, however, was the status
of the immunity decree promulgated
soon after the release of the hostages.
The Magistrate’s Court had earlier
acquitted a Speight supporter for
attempted murder on the grounds 
that he was covered by the immunity
decree. This acquittal was subse-
quently overturned by the High
Court, after it ruled that the decree
was invalid. By year’s end the issue
remained unresolved, with a final
decision pending in the Court of
Appeal. Aside from the issue of
immunity, prosecution efforts were
also hampered by the inability of the
office of the director of public prose-
cution to gather sufficient evidence
against some of the accused to bring
them to trial. On 11 October, nine
c rw soldiers were discharged by the
Magistrate’s Court, after charges of
treason against them were dropped.
This was followed by the dismissal on
6 December of treason charges against
four key members of the Speight
group held on Nukulau.
The failure to prosecute certain
individuals, despite what appeared to
be very clear and public acts of intent
to depose the People’s Coalition Gov-
e rnment, drew wide criticism and con-
c e rn. Questions were raised about the
integrity and competence of the prose-
cutor’s office, about apparent incon-
sistencies in the application of the law,
but most of all about the likely conse-
quences for the country if the remain-
ing members of the Speight group
were to be released, including Speight
himself. The court proceedings proved
to be a double-edged sword for the
interim administration, exposing its
highly tenuous legal and political
position, while seeking to contain 
the dangerous instability that still
remained.
Just how dangerous this situation
was became tragically apparent soon
after the release of the nine soldiers in
mid-October. In what was described
as an act of compassion and mercy,
the nine were accepted back by the
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military and allowed to resume duties
under close supervision. It was not
long before some of these same sol-
diers allegedly joined forces with other
members of the First Meridian Squad-
ron (more often referred to as the
c rw unit) in an attempt to overthrow
the military commander. The plot,
which reportedly involved a number
of prominent chiefs, ultimately aimed
to replace the Qarase administration
with one more sympathetic to, if not
including, the Speight group. A variety
of motives for the mutiny were later
reported: to thwart investigations into
the events of 19 May, to avenge the
perceived mistreatment of c rw sol-
diers and civilians by the army after
the storming of the Kalabu village
school, and to stop the rumored dis-
banding of the c rw unit.
The mutiny began at lunchtime on
2 November at the main barracks of
the Fiji army outside Suva. A group of
about forty soldiers (led by some offi-
cers) opened fire on the commander’s
office, taking control of the armory,
the national command center, and the
officers’ mess, and holding a number
of hostages. Public reaction was at
first muted, as many assumed a minor
internal fracas. But as casualties
mounted, with Suva’s main hospital
having to cope with an unprecedented
number of emergencies, the serious-
ness of the situation became apparent.
The mutiny was probably doomed
early on, when the commander
managed to escape the barracks 
and assume control from the relative
safety of a suburban army base. But
the rebel soldiers continued to hold
out well into the evening. It was later
reported that a mass of civilian sup-
porters were waiting at nearly Kalabu
village, to be bussed into the barr a c k s ,
where they would provide a human
shield in a re-run of the parliamentary
takeover. However, the army sealed
off access to the barracks, preventing
the villagers from carrying out this
plan. As evening fell, the largest unit
in the army (the Third Battalion Fiji
Infantry Regiment), which had been
away on a training exercise at the
time of the mutiny, together with the
navy and other military contingents,
mounted an assault on the barracks.
They succeeded in taking back control
of all installations and capturing a
number of the mutineers. About
twenty escaped, later to be captured
or to surrender. The death toll was
eight soldiers (three “loyalists” and
five “rebels”). Over thirty people,
including some civilians caught in
crossfire, were injured. 
The brutal killing of the three
“loyal” soldiers (one shot dead while
he slept, another while he worked at
his desk), and the ferocious retaliation
of the army against the mutineers, left
the people of Fiji shocked and shaken.
The mutiny showed how far the coun-
t ry ’s “civility” had been eroded and
how close to the point of disintegra-
tion it had come. Apart from the
obvious issues it raised—How could
this have been prevented? What was
Rabuka doing in the barracks at the
height of the fighting? Who, apart
from the rebel soldiers, was involved?
—the mutiny confronted the country
with some bigger questions. What was
the answer to Fiji’s steadily worsening
economic and political problems?
How could meaningful reconciliation
and recovery be achieved? And did
the interim government have a future?
On the last question, many observers
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had begun to doubt that it did, given
its perceived failure to provide effec-
tive leadership and a clear sense of
direction.
The Fiji High Court provided the
interim government with perhaps its
greatest challenge. In what would
p rove a defining moment for the coun-
t ry, High Court Justice Anthony Gates
handed down a ruling on 15 Novem-
ber that declared the 1997 constitu-
tion extant, the parliament elected in
1999 intact, and Qarase’s interim gov-
e rnment without any “constitutional
foundation of legality.” He called for
Ratu Mara (whom he declared still
the president since there was “no evi-
dence” that he had resigned) to recon-
vene parliament and appoint a prime
minister who could command the
confidence of the House, and sug-
gested that a constitutionally based
government of national unity be set
up (Times, 16 Nov 2000, 7).
The reaction to this ruling was per-
haps predictable. While it was warmly
welcomed by members of the deposed
government, their supporters, civil
society groups, the legal fratern i t y, a n d
foreign governments, it was received
with hostility and skepticism by many
others. The interim administration
rejected the ruling entirely and vowed
to take the case to the Court of
Appeal (claiming that proper proce-
dures were not followed and it had
been prevented from putting its evi-
dence before the court). But the
administration also appeared to
dismiss the relevance of the court’s
ruling, with Qarase claiming that his
government drew its authority from
its appointment by the president, who
in turn was mandated by the Great
Council of Chiefs, which in turn was
acting in accordance with the author-
ity vested in it by the 1874 Deed of
Cession. 
Meetings of Fijian leaders, held to
discuss the Gates ruling, created a new
wave of instability and uncertainty. As
the year ended, there were warnings
of renewed violence should the Gates
ruling be enforced, with many sug-
gesting that political solutions come
before legal solutions. Said one chief,
“Do the judges want turmoil to con-
tinue in the country? The law is one
thing but reality is another” (Times,
2 Dec 2000, 3). These meetings
prompted the army to warn, in turn,
against agitation and rumor monger-
ing. The army’s position, in the wake
of the mutiny, was clearly to prevent
any upsurge in civil unrest and threats
to national security. But it faced a
growing dilemma. While pledging
loyalty to the president it had
installed, Ratu Iloilo, and support
for the interim government, the army
also recognized the likely national and
international repercussions of ignor-
ing the court’s ruling. Foreign gov-
ernments, the union movement, and
human rights organizations vowed
swift retaliation should Fiji not return
to a legal and democratic system of
government.
The dawn of the new millennium
saw the country poised precariously
between disaster and salvation. The
events of 2000 could not be undone,
nor could the enormous price paid by
the people and the economy be com-
pensated. Yet it remained to be seen
whether Fiji’s leaders, particularly the
interim government, the Great Coun-
cil of Chiefs, and the army, had the
vision and courage to put Fiji on the
path to long-term recovery. A lasting
solution would only be realized when
all political leaders, and all the differ-
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ent communities, were involved in a
p rocess of dialogue and re c o n c i l i a t i o n .
This should include a full and honest
debate about the reasons behind the
coup attempt. But too many Fijian
leaders had yet to embrace this notion,
committed instead to racist prescrip-
tions and policies that denied any
voice to the country’s other communi-
ties and ethnic groups. As it greeted
the new year, what Fiji desperately
needed was a chance to redeem its
future, a future that continued to be
held hostage—like the People’s Coali-
tion Government had been—by the
greed and folly of an influential few.
sandra ta rt e
R e f e re n c e s
PNB, Pacific News Bulletin. Monthly. Suva. 
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New Ca l e d o n i a
Year two of the Noumea Accord
(Chappell 1999) saw continuing
movement toward self-government but
also ongoing tensions in the fragile
consensus that produced the fifteen-
to-twenty-year agreement in 1998. In
a May issue of l’Express a scathing
article entitled, “The Discords of
Noumea” (Conan 2000), highlighted
contradictory interpretations by the
signatories of what the accord meant,
a lack of collegiality in the territorial
congress, growing disunity among
Kanak politicians, disputes over the
provincial shares of a partial localiza-
tion of the Société le Nickel (s l n),
and arguments over the role of indig-
enous Kanak custom in forming a
common nationhood among diverse,
often polarized, ethnic groups. It was
a year filled with discord, but in Octo-
ber the country tried to put on a hope-
ful face by hosting the eighth Festival
of Pacific Arts, a regional honor that
its political strife had canceled fifteen
years earlier.
Having experienced tragic inter-
communal bloodshed in the 1980s,
New Caledonian leaders voiced no
support for the actions of extremists
in neighboring Fiji in May 2 0 0 0. R o c k
Wamytan, president of the Front de
Libération Nationale Kanak et Social-
iste (flnks) condemned the Fijian
coup attempt by George Speight: “ T h e
nationalist claims of Melanesians must
be taken into account, but in a demo-
cratic framework.” Wamytan blamed
Britain for the ethnic crisis in Fiji, but
he also recommended that Indo-F i j i a n s
take steps to share economic power
with native Fijians (NC, 25 May
2000). Likewise, Leopold Jorédié,
Kanak vice-president of the New
Caledonian executive council, said his
government “will not support a coup.
To us, it is obvious that any govern-
ment must come out of the will of the
people” (pir 25 May 2000). Aloisio
Sako, president of the Wallisian
Rassemblement Démocratique
Océanien (r d o), called the Fijian coup
a dangerous case of misdirected ethnic
antagonism that trampled on funda-
mental human rights (Sako 2000).
The issue of “collegiality” in the
congress had come up soon after the
1999 elections, when millionaire
Jacques Lafleur’s loyalist Rassemble-
ment pour la Calédonie dans la
République (rpcr) gained a narrow
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majority (28 to 26) by allying with
Kanak dissidents of the Fédération des
Comités de Coordination Indépen-
dantistes (fcci). This coalition
enabled conservative Jean Lèques to
become president of the new execu-
tive and Jorédié of the fcci, vice-pres-
ident—when both Paris and Wamytan
had expected someone from the flnks
to hold the latter position. In the cabi-
net, the rpcr-fcci outnumbered the
flnks 7 to 4, vindicating the concerns
of critics like Gerard Jodor, of the
pro-independence labor federation
Union Syndicaliste des Travailleurs
Kanak et Exploités (u s t k e), who had
predicted that the self-government
measures delegated to the territory
over the next generation by the Nou-
mea Accord would simply replace
French colonial rule with domination
by Lafleur’s local business “mafia”
(Chappell 1999). 
At the end of April, just before the
second anniversary of the Noumea
Accord, the four flnks cabinet minis-
ters denounced the drift of the rpcr
away from the consensual spirit of the
accord. Wamytan accused the rpcr’s
dominating attitude of causing dys-
function in the country’s institutions.
The flnks had taken its complaints
about lack of information-sharing 
to administrative court five times,
because “the State must play its role
of arbiter” (NC, 29 Apr 2000). French
Secretary of State for Overseas
Administrations Jean-Jack Queyranne
visited the territory in early May to
plead for more consultation between
the rpcr and the flnks, to honor the
spirit of dialogue embedded in the
1998 accord. Although the first port-
folios, such as primary education, had
begun to be transferred from Paris to
the Territorial Congress in January,
“The French state has not withdrawn
from New Caledonia,” he said, “it is
a full partner, a participant, and at the
same time it must accompany New
Caledonia in its evolution.” Despite
growing disarray within the flnks,
Queyranne defended its status as one
of three signatories to the Matignon
(1988) and Noumea Accords, along
with France and the rpcr. Wamytan
threatened to walk out of the con-
gress, but Lèques defended majority
rule, and Lafleur said that if the fl n k s
left, nobody would notice (NC, 2, 3
May 2 0 0 0; p i r 2, 3 M a y 2 0 0 0; Conan
2000). 
The rpcr had its loyalist critics,
such as Didier Leroux’s Alliance and
the right-wing Front National, but the
four-party flnks has suffered more
from internal splintering. As early 
as 1995, its second largest coalition
member, the Parti de Libération
Kanak (Palika) ran on a separate elec-
toral ticket (Chappell 1999). In 1998,
key dissidents such as François Burck,
Raphael Mapou, and Jorédié broke
away from the flnks to form the
fcci, while the Parti Socialist Kanak,
a small party composed of talkative
French leftists, became defunct, to be
replaced by Sako’s rdo. At the March
2000 annual congress of the flnks,
more internal differences emerged.
Victor Tutugoro, president of the
Union Progressiste Mélanésienne
(upm), told the press, “We don’t have
a clear orientation, and no working
methods.” The flnks normally left to
local committees the task of political
mobilization, and members of the
Union Calédonienne (uc), the largest
and oldest Kanak party, questioned
whether the flnks, while symbolizing
a national liberation struggle, could
also function as an electoral tool. In
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early April, seven elected members of
the uc vowed to act as an autono-
mous group in the congress, leaving
only three uc delegates within the
flnks, including Wamytan. Bernard
Lepeu, recently displaced from the uc
presidency by Wamytan, joined the
new uc group, along with Nicole
Waia, a Kanak news analyst at Radio
Djiido. Wamytan called the secession
by delegates elected on the u c-fl n k s
list illegal and demanded a party dis-
ciplinary council (NC, 6, 22, 26 April
2000; pir 20 Mar 2000).
Meanwhile, the results of the May
1999 election in the Islands Province
were revoked by the French Council
of State for irregularities in counting
absentee ballots, a key factor since
half of all Loyalty Islanders live and
work in the industrial Southern Prov-
ince. The new election in June 2000
revealed more factionalism within
Kanak ranks. The u c-fl n k s, led by
Richard Kaloi, ran separately from
Palika, led by Charles Washetine, but
collectively they hoped to retain their
narrow majority in the provincial
council with active support from
u st k e, a former flnks member in the
1980s. Their opponents united under
the banner of “A New Challenge for
the Islands” and included four groups
that critics called an “alliance against
nature”: former Kanak radical
Nidoish Naisseline’s Libération Kanak
Socialiste (l k s), an odd reincarnation
of just-deceased Kanak hard l i n e r Ya n n
Céléné Uregei’s Front Uni de Libéra-
t i o nK a n a k (f ulk), and the r p c r-f cci,
led by Simon Loueckhote, loyalist
chair of the Territorial Congress. 
Naisseline, a high chief of Mare,
accused the fl n k s of trying to colo-
nize his province with a bloated
bureaucracy and of neglecting Kanak
custom—an issue that twenty years
ago caused him to split off from
Palika, which still espouses an eclectic
brand of “scientific socialism.” Kanak
nationalist critics called him a “ s n i p e r ”
who wanted power only for himself,
but former Kanak militant Cono
Hamu, now head of the fcci in the
Islands Province, said the coalition
wanted to open up the province to
outside investment to create more
jobs. Washetine, an emerging star of
Palika, emphasized education, his
specialty, and wanted to redirect the
Islands Province economy toward the
new mining projects in the Kanak-
dominated Northern Province. The
pro-independence parties won the
election, 8 seats to 6, as in 1999,
with the uc-flnks holding 6 seats to
Palika’s 2 (NC, 7, 26 June 2000; NH,
15, 22 June 2000). Palika celebrated
its gains in the province, however,
since it had been primarily a party of
Grande Terre, the main island, since
Naisseline split off in 1981 (Kanak,
Aug 2000). 
Pro-independence leaders dismissed
the fcci defectors who collaborated
with Lafleur in the congress, including
two former presidents of the uc, for
needing Lafleur’s patronage because
of financial crises. In fact, Jorédié was
indicted in late 1999 for financial cor-
ruption during his term as president
of the Northern Province in the mid-
1990s, when he still belonged to the
uc. He had allegedly diverted (or
allowed to be diverted) provincial
funds to members of his family and
hometown for business enterprises. In
January, Jorédié received a one-year
suspended sentence for illegally
“ingesting” funds, and his wife and
two daughters received one to three
months of the same, while an aide and
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his wife got prison terms of four and
two years, respectively (NC, 13 Dec
1999, 5 Jan 2000). Jorédié described
himself as a “nationalist, but realis-
tic,” since France still directly finances
the development of the country. “I’m
not selling dreams,” he said. “To talk
about independence these days is an
e x e rcise of demagoguery” (N C, 2 0 A p r
2000). Mapou, once a Palika hard-
liner, also had serious financial diffi-
culties before he joined the fcci
(Pabouty 2000; Wapotro 2000),
though publicly he opposed the ten-
dency for the three provincial govern-
ments to pursue their own develop-
ment policies rather than coordinating
a broader plan (NC, 21 Dec 2000). 
Maurice Lenormand, former presi-
dent of the uc in the 1950s, said that
economic progress must take prece-
dence over political sovereignty:
“Independence is only a word.” But
he observed that the younger genera-
tion, both Kanak and Caledonian, is
seeking its own national identity in a
regional context (NC, 6 Dec 2000).
Billy Wapotro of the Protestant
Educational Alliance predicted that
increasing numbers of university-edu-
cated Kanak militants would change
local politics, because they had precise
plans for development projects, not
vague ideologies. Washetine compared
the rise of Palika in the North and
Islands to the generational change-
of-guard that occurred in the 1970s,
when Palika emerged out of the radi-
cal student movements. He claimed
that many, like himself, were attracted
to Palika because of its long-term
vision of socioeconomic change and
grassroots organizational approach
(Wapotro 2000; Washetine 2000). In
November, Wamytan was reelected
president of both the uc and the
flnks. The flnks decided to recog-
nize the separate existence of the dis-
sident uc group within its framework,
at the same time expanding the mem-
bership and coordinating the powers
of its Political Bureau to curb further
splintering. The coalition reaffirmed
its commitment to ultimate indepen-
dence and improved relations with
regional organizations (NC, 27 Nov
2000; pir 30 Nov 2000). The uc
declared its status as “founding father
and nourishing mother” of the flnks,
and Palika considered joining its allies
on a single list for the municipal elec-
tions of 2001 (NC, 23 Nov, 18 Dec
2000).
In the French political system,
municipal elections come directly
under the control of Paris, as do local
courts and police. Ironically, consider-
ing the promise made in the Noumea
Accord to restrict the territorial elec-
torate to long-term residents and
establish a New Caledonian national-
ity, three thousand citizens of the
European Union resident in the terri-
tory will be eligible to vote in the
2001 municipal elections (NC, 19
Dec 2000). Furthermore, in June the
French Parliament voted 339 to 2 that
its new rule requiring men and women
to be represented in equal numbers on
party electoral lists must be extended
to France’s three Pacific territories,
starting with the 2001 municipal elec-
tions. An amendment proposed by
Loueckhote to exempt New Caledonia
f rom the parity rule until 2 0 03, on the
grounds that the Kanak-dominated
Northern and Island Provinces are
not yet ready for such a measure, was
hotly opposed by the Association of
New Caledonia’s Women Citizens,
who petitioned both the congress and
the French Parliament and marched in
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protest in Noumea on International
Wo m en’s D a y. The fl n ks a n d L e ro u x ’s
Alliance, among other local parties,
supported the reform (NC, 4 Mar, 23
June 2000; pir 15 Mar 2000; Kanak,
May 2000). 
Sako said the rdo was organizing
Wallisian and Futunan women for the
upcoming electoral challenge. An issue
of concern for migrants from Wallis
a nd F u t u na w as t he “ p a rt i c u l ar a c c o rd”
provided for in the Noumea Accord
between that French Pacific territory
and New Caledonia. More than half
of all Wallisians and Futunans now
live in the mineral-rich terr i t o ry, and
their homeland depends heavily on
family remittances because it lacks
other resources for income. The cre-
ation of a local citizenship in New
Caledonia to restrict the electorate
and working rights to long-term resi-
dents might call into question the
presence of 6,000 Wallisians and
Futunans in the territory who are
recent migrants. In February and
April, traditional leaders from the
poorer territory met with officials and
customary leaders in New Caledonia
to discuss ways to maintain an open
relationship while regulating immigra-
tion. Tino Manuohalalo of the rdo
holds a cabinet post in the New Cale-
donian government responsible for
health and social affairs, because
several thousand poor Wallisians live
as squatters around Noumea. Sako
pointed out that in the past ten years,
2,000 Europeans have immigrated to
the territory, compared to only about
1,500 Wallisians, so the “threat” from
Wallisians to New Caledonian self-
determination was exaggerated. The
uc was more welcoming than Palika
to Wallisians, he said, but either way
new migrants will no longer have free
access to local jobs as French citizens.
France would have to provide more
economic development aid to Wallis
and Futuna to keep the migrants
home, but talks progressed slowly
because of the poorer territory’s
dependency and continued to the end
of the year (pir 3 Feb, 7 Apr 2000;
NC, 14 Oct 2000; Sako 2000; Mole-
ana 2000). 
Nickel mining remained conten-
tious, beginning with strikes and
b l o c k a d es b y t he Syndicat des O u v r i e r s
et Employés de Nouvelle-Calédonie
(soenc) against the sln in Febru a ry
and Marc h. The union pro t e s t e d
restructuring plans by the sln to
increase output and lower production
costs, which would mean job losses.
soenc slowed down smelting at the
Doniambo plant in Noumea, blocked
the loading of ore tankers, and put up
roadblocks for seven weeks, and then,
after signing a government-negotiated
agreement, resumed its strike actions.
The sln lost about us$20 million,
and even other labor unions protested
the “waste” caused by soenc disputes
(p i r 2 2 Feb, 13, 2 0 Mar 2 0 00). Mean-
while, plans for other nickel-process-
ing plants proceeded. The Northern
Province, in partnership with the
Canadian group Falconbridge, said
that current studies of the Koniambo
site should enable a decision to be
made by the end of 2002 about the
feasibility of the much-touted “north-
ern factory,” which Kanak leaders
hope will create 800 jobs and produce
54,000 tons a year (pir 20 Jan 2000).
Another Canadian firm, Inco, said
that its pilot project for a second
“southern factory” besides Doniambo
has been so successful that it plans to
invest about us$100 million in con-
structing the plant in 2001, hoping 
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to employ 1,000 people and produce
55,000 tons a year (NC, 15 Dec 2000).
sln-owned Doniambo normally
employs 1,400 people and produces
5 7,0 0 0 tons a year (p i r 2 6 July 2 0 0 0) ,
and another consortium is exploring
the possibility of building a fourth
p rocessing plant at Prony (N C, 2 1 N o v
2000). 
New Caledonia has one third of
the world’s total nickel reserves and
ranks third in world output. Nickel
provides 90 percent of the territory’s
exports and employs 10 percent of
the population. Profits have increased
because the Asian stainless-steel mar-
ket has caused a rise in the world
price for nickel (pir 20 Jan, 27 Apr
2000). The most contested issue of
2000 was the debate over provincial
shares of the partial “localization” of
30 percent of the sln and 8 percent
of its parent, Eramet. The previous
year, France had voted a credit of
us$1 billion to the new Société Terri-
toriale Calédonienne de Participation
Industrielle (s t c p i) to enable New
Caledonia to buy French state-owned
shares of the sln and invest the divi-
dends in local development projects.
The Kanak-ruled Northern Province
was due to receive 50.5 percent of the
devolved shares, and the rpcr-ruled
Southern Province 49.5 percent, in
order to promote the regional “rebal-
ancing” called for in the Matignon
and Noumea Accords. The flnks had
been delighted, seeing the agreement
as a needed boost to development in
the relatively backward Kanak prov-
inces, but in February 2000, Pierre
Frogier of the rpcr withdrew his sig-
nature from the document, suddenly
opposing the majority control of the
s t c p i by the North. Lafleur had dis-
liked the mining shares deal from the
start, especially the possibility that the
North could convert its Eramet shares
into s l n shares and gain majority
control of the s l n itself, thus making
the s l n “hostage” to politics (Conan
2000). 
This objection was ironic, consider-
ing that Lafleur himself had once sold
the North the mining firm, the Société
Minière du Sud-Pacifique (s m s p), that
was developing the northern factory!
Despite efforts by French High Com-
missioner Thierry Lataste and special
envoy Alain Christnacht, the flnks
and the rpcr could not come to terms
by May, and France made threats to
call off the whole deal (pir 6 Apr, 14
May 2000). Finally, in July, Quey-
ranne, Lataste, and French Prime Min-
ister Lionel Jospin (who signed the
Noumea Accord) announced the sign-
ing of a new agreement that would
divide the shares 50-50 between the
North and the South, with the Islands
Province participating in the North’s
allocation. But the North and Islands
will receive 75 percent of future prof-
its and hold the chair of the s t c p i
(pir 26 July, 23 Aug 2000). Tragi-
cally, s m s p Chair Raphael Pidjot, one
of the educated bright lights of the
independence movement, died in a
helicopter crash in November at the
age of forty, along with five s m s p
technical and financial managers.
Wamytan said, “Enough is enough.
Enough of these suspicious deaths”
(NC, 29 Nov 2000; pir 4, 21 Dec
2000). Yet Mapou of the fcci warned
of the environmental costs of addi-
tional nickel mining, noting that a
billion tons had so far been extracted,
stripping away forests and polluting
precious waterways (NC, 11 Dec
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2000), a sentiment shared by the ter-
ritory’s small Green Party (Boengkih
2000).
The issue of working rights in New
Caledonia, embodied in the Noumea
Accord, produced a much-heralded
“social pact” among the government,
employers, and labor unions. In
March, President Jean Lèques urged
the creation of a “code of good con-
duct” to prevent the disruptive labor
conflicts that characterized the terri-
tory. By August, five months of tense
negotiations had generated a twenty-
page draft, and on 20 October the
“social partners” (employers and
unions) and state officials signed the
final document. The resulting agree-
ment proclaimed a new vision of
social relations, in which employers
and workers would respect each
other’s viewpoints and rights in order
to construct, in peace, a more devel-
oped, productive, and equitable econ-
omy. The pact recognized employers’
managerial power while acknowledg-
ing workers’ right to organize and to
elect representatives to negotiate on
their behalf. The minimum wage
would gradually be increased to
100,000 c f p (about us$1,000) per
month by 2003, while comprehensive
health care, pensions, lodging, and
familial allowances would be made
more widely available, job-creation
would receive new emphasis, and
long-term residents would be favored
in local hiring. To avert costly strikes,
the pact included measures such as
mandatory negotiating and mediation
periods and government-supported
agents and commissions to promote
dialogue, as well as restrictions on 
the right to strike in essential air and
maritime transport industries and a
required minimum of social services.
The pact was said to safeguard both
social democracy and public order and
was endorsed by loyalist and indepen-
dence parties, the major employer
associations, and eleven of fifteen
labor unions (NC, 4 Mar, 21 Nov
2000; pir 20 Aug, 22 Nov 2000;
B a n i a n , Oct 2 0 0 0; K a n a k, Nov 2 0 0 0) .
Unfortunately, the mining branch
of soenc called a wildcat strike on 16
November, putting up roadblocks and
d e s t roying buildings. While 1 8 0 p o l i c e
confronted the strikers, Lafleur autho-
rized Jorédié to grant soenc’s primary
demand: raising the minimum wage to
100,000 c f p by July 2001, two years
earlier than the social pact had called
for. Lèques, the employers, and other
labor unions immediately decried this
concession to force, arguing that the
h a rd-won social pact was almost moot
under such conditions. The pro-inde-
pendence parties boycotted the next
meeting of the Territorial Congress
and accused the rpcr and the fcci of
betraying the pact and demonstrating
yet again their lack of collegial con-
sultation. Didier Guenant-Jeanson,
secretary-general of the largest labor
federation, said that voters who
approved the Noumea Accord did 
not want “a banana republic,” and in
early December he led two thousand
m a rchers in support of democracy, not
dictatorship. Sylvain Nea of soenc
responded by organizing more barri-
cades on roads and mine sites on 20
December (NC, 18–28 Nov, 13, 21
Dec 2000). 
Pierre Frogier of the r p c r, one of
New Caledonia’s parliamentary repre-
sentatives in Paris, accused the uc of
opposing the minimum-wage increase
in order to keep rural Kanak clans
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out of the cash economy and without
access to education, and thus allow 
its party elite a free hand without
accountability (N H, 23–29 Nov 2000).
Pro-independence u s t k e had refused
even to sign the social pact, calling it
“deceitful.” Its new president, Gérard
Jodar (who replaced Louis Kotra
Uregei), withdrew his federation from
the Intersyndicat of the four largest
unions, strengthened its ties to metro-
politan leftist labor movements, and
declared u s t k e’s intention to form a
new political party, if necessary, to
protect the interests of workers. He
cited the police action against his
union when it was striking in front of
the Numbo cement factory in April-
May as evidence of government eff o rt s
to restrict the rights of workers. That
clash had resulted in several injuries
and protest marches (NC, 24 May, 5
Dec 2000; pir 22 Oct 2000). Never-
theless, congress voted the accelerated
raise in the minimum wage as a “law
of the country” in late December, with
the support of all parties but Waia’s
uc group, who said it discredited the
social pact (N C, 29 Dec 2000).
Enacting new “laws of the coun-
try” is one of the powers devolved
from Paris to the territory by the
Noumea Accord. The proposed
fifteen-to-twenty-year transitional
period has already yielded changes in
local tax laws to compensate for the
withdrawal of some metropolitan
funding, since a self-governing coun-
try-to-be needs to find ways to finance
itself, at least partly. French monetary
transfers still constitute the largest
source of income for the territory, and
though administrative funding has
dropped, development aid from Paris
has increased 16 percent since the
Noumea Accord, mainly for health
care, education, rural electrification,
and road building (NC, 8 Dec 2000).
To sustain local government funding,
congress introduced a 4 percent tax
on services in March, except for essen-
tials such as public transport. In July,
eight old taxes were scrapped and
replaced with an 11 percent duty 
on all imported luxury goods, and
another 11 percent tax on “cultural
and sports” products, such as bicycles
and musical instruments. In Novem-
b e r, s o e n c and two other labor unions
protested with sit-ins against the tax-
driven rise in fuel prices, asking for an
immediate increase in the minimum
wage (pir 3 Mar, 31 July, 17 Nov
2000). But congress still enacted a tax
on air freight of 8 percent to finance
the expansion of Air Caledonia
International (Aircalin), and taxed
imported agricultural products to sub-
sidize local farmers (NC, 5 Dec 2000). 
The expansion of Aircalin, which is
84 percent owned by the territorial
government, was a major issue in
congress for much of the year. The
goal was to develop New Caledonia’s
air links within the Pacific region by
acquiring three Airbuses, mainly to
bring in more Japanese tourists from
Osaka and Tokyo. Marianne Devaux
of the r p c r, vice president of the
Southern Province and president of
the Agency for Air Service in New
Caledonia, saw Aircalin’s growth as
crucial to development: “Without
financing by Paris, we will remain
dependent on Air France” (NC, 29
Dec 2000; pir 29 Mar, 23 Nov 2000).
But Paris stalled on releasing the funds
for the Airbuses until the end of the
year, and Air France said it was deter-
mined to remain in the region, despite
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recent losses and labor disputes. Both
Leroux’s Alliance and the uc opposed
the financial risk of expansion (NC,
22–30 Dec 2000). In late December,
congress passed a us$600 million
budget for 2001, of which 75 percent
was slated for the three provincial
governments. The territory would
invest in public buildings, roads, and
sporting facilities, and give special
funding to health, petrol subsidies,
and agriculture, but cut spending on
tourism, job creation, the arts, and
libraries (pir 28 Dec 2000; NC, 28
Dec 2000). The Southern Province
allocated more money to health care,
education, housing, employment, and
tourism, but complained that it did
not get enough budgetary help, con-
sidering that it was home to 68 per-
cent of the population (NC, 14 Oct,
14 Dec 2000). The North, its main
rival, has created not only the nickel
smelting project but also a commerc i a l
tuna fishing fleet, and funded tourism
and agriculture, despite criticisms by
political opponents and labor unions
of Paul Neaoutyine’s Palika-dominated
regime (NC, 4 May, 19–30 Dec 2000;
pir 11 Dec 2000). Recent exploration
for offshore oil and gas has generated
lively speculations (N C, 1 6 June 2 0 0 0) .
The Noumea Accord called for
Kanak identity to be the centerpost 
of the new, albeit multiethnic, nation.
Talk of socioeconomic modernization
inevitably raises questions about the
role of indigenous custom in future
development. The fcci proposed con-
structing a single nationality, not “a
Kanak nationalism of the ghetto,” by
promoting individualism and democ-
r a c y. Elie Poigoune of Palika org a n i z e s
students within schools, finds retirees
to tutor young Kanak, and urges the
creation of a “common elite.” Accord-
ing to Burck, a former uc president,
“Those who now claim Kanak iden-
tity the most are often those who live
completely like Europeans!” Women
increasingly rebel against Kanak cus-
tom, as do migrants to Noumea for
education and jobs, and the Kanak
rate of success in F rench schools is
still very low (Conan 2000). The 1998
accord recognized Kanak vernacular
languages as appropriate to teach in
schools, but instructors need training.
Octave Togna of the Kanak Culture
Development Agency suggested
choosing one widespread local lan-
guage to counter the use of French
exclusively, but the Kanak peoples
have twenty-eight languages and
immigrant groups another half dozen
(p i r 22 Mar 2000). Louis Mapou of
the Agency for Rural Development
and Land Reform held a June confer-
ence on the thorny issue of how to
decide which lands belong to which
Kanak tribe, given that both precolo-
nial migrations and colonial adminis-
trative and reservation policies altered
customary ownership claims (NC,
3 June 2000).
The cultural highlight of the year
was the eighth Pacific Arts Festival,
held in October and early November
in Noumea and some upcountry
towns. Jean-Marie Tjibaou’s 1975
Melanesia 2000 festival had received
financial and technical support from
moderates in the French administra-
tion but also generated protests from
radical Kanak, who called it a “folk-
lorization” of their culture. People
who supported that festival saw it as
the Kanak reclaiming their “place in
the sun,” as Tjibaou put it. Jacques
Boengkih of the Tjibaou Cultural
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Center has long promoted respect for
traditional Kanak leadership and pro-
tocol, including the consultative cus-
tomary Senate created by the Noumea
Accord. He said that France had can-
celed the planned Pacific Arts Festival
in Noumea in the mid-1980s when
the country was in turmoil. This time
around, local politicians, both loyalist
and pro-independence, tried to coopt
the ceremonies, but the gathering was
again a prime opportunity to repre-
sent Kanak identity to the region
(Boengkih 2000). Déwé Gorodey of
Palika, a Kanak activist, writer, and
educator, and now the cabinet minis-
ter for culture, youth, and sports, sup-
ported the Arts Festival, but she
admitted that exclusively “Kanak
independence” is no longer a realistic
option (Gorodey 2000). Lafleur pub-
lished his autobiography in May, in
which he criticized French officials
who had backed the Kanak against
Caledonians (pir 7 May 2000). 
The opening of the festival in late
October was delayed by three days,
officially because of bad weather but
also because of protests by Kanak
artists and musicians over cultural
property rights and a strike over pro-
motions by u s t k e that prevented
Radio France Overseas (r f o) from
broadcasting the festival on television.
Independence parties, however, con-
demned such disruptions: “At a time
when the Noumea Accord consecrates
the full recognition of Kanak culture,
the gathering of other cultural groups
of the country around it, and the
opening of the country to its geo-
graphic surroundings, the flnks Polit-
ical Bureau regards boycotts of this
effort as unwelcome.” Christian Paul,
the newly appointed French Secretary
of State for Overseas Administrations,
thus had to face his first crisis when
he arrived, but the r f o and u s t k e
finally reached agreement (NC, 5 Oct
2000; pir 1 Sept, 23–26 Oct 2000). 
For the first few days, Festival Vil-
lage in Noumea, on the site of the old
United States military headquarters in
World War Two, was the center of
activity, but then the cultural perfor-
mances moved to the Northern and
Islands Provinces. Some visitors com-
plained that too many French were
running the show, especially in Nou-
mea, and that the official translators
did not always properly convey
messages intended for the people of
“Kanaky,” while others complained
about facilities or food logistics. But
the mayor of Koné and the president
of the Northern Province praised the
sharing of Oceanian cultures and
voiced the heartfelt pride of the often-
isolated Kanak hosts, and many visi-
tors from other Pacific islands seemed
to find the experience of indigenous
intercultural contacts moving.
Neaoutyine explained, “There is a
strong will and in the end no need 
for language because people recognize
each other through their customs. We
watch and we understand” (pir 31
Oct, 14 Nov 2000).
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Solomon Islands
Solomon Islanders have not experi-
enced a worse start to a year in
decades. In January 2000, Solomon
Sunaone Mamaloni, one of the coun-
try’s veteran politicians and its first
leader, passed away. Sir Peter Kenilo-
rea’s approbation of his friend and
schoolmate as “the father of modern
politics in Solomon Islands” could not
have been more apt (SS, 18 Jan 2000,
5). In politics, Mamaloni was an all-
rounder. He was a real “man of the
people.” He would fit most Solomon
Islanders’ honor list. When in need,
Solomon Islanders, especially ordinary
villagers, found him most accessible,
even when he was prime minister.
And without fail, Solo (as he was
endearingly dubbed) would go an
extra mile to help another wantok.
Solo had long fiercely defended Solo-
mon Islands’ sovereignty and the right
of Solomon Islanders to “do their own
thing.” If they learned from their mis-
takes, they should not fear making
them. His experience during British
colonialism taught him an important
lesson—it was far better for Solomon
Islanders to carve their own futures
and destiny than be subject to igno-
minious racism, vacuous high-minded-
ness, and mindless arrogance, which
Solomon Islanders detested. Mama-
loni has left a leadership lacuna that
will be difficult to fill for a long time,
as events that unfolded in subsequent
months have attested.
The 1999 census revealed that 
the population of the country had
increased by 43 percent overall, from
285,176 in 1986 to 409,042. The
growth rate declined markedly from
3.5 percent per year to 2.8 percent per
year. Some 41.5 percent of the popu-
lation is aged under fifteen years. But
the census showed that only 23 per-
cent of the population (57,472) were
paying taxes. Conversely, 45 percent
(111, 905) were involved in unpaid
labor (SS, 8 Sept 2000, 3).
The sporadic ethnic fighting that
began in late 1998 between the
Malaita Eagle Force (m e f) and the
Isatabu Freedom Movement (ifm)
continued. However, it was limited
mostly to areas around and peripheral
to Honiara. In February, the Malaita
Eagle Force claimed responsibility for
several killings at Pelaha and Lunga
areas (SS, 23 Feb 2000, 1). These
intermittent insurgencies and killings
merely escalated animosity between
the two groups. In early July, the
Malaita Eagle Force mounted opera-
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tion “Eagle Storm.” A bulldozer was
converted into a “tank,” which helped
them mount raids. The Malaita Eagle
Force was able to gain greater control
of the area from Alligator Creek to
Solomon Island Plantations Limited
(s i p l; SS, 4 July 2000, 1). 
On 5 June a “civil takeover” of the
government of the Solomon Islands
Alliance for Change occurred. Prime
Minister Bartholomew Ulufa‘alu was
put under house arrest and asked to
“voluntarily” resign within forty-eight
hours by the newly formed Joint Mili-
tary Operation (jm o), which com-
prised the Malaita Eagle Force and
members of the Paramilitary Force
(SS, 4 July 2000, 6). The main reason
given for the takeover was Ulufa‘alu’s
delay in seriously and urgently
addressing the ethnic uprising. The
Joint Military Operation claimed he
seemed to have done very little to
stop the conflict. Meanwhile the Isa-
tabu Freedom Movement continued
to harass or kill innocent people and
brew mayhem around the capital. 
The Joint Military Operation
seized the Rove police armories and
weapons on patrol boats and con-
trolled the country’s telecommunica-
tion facilities. It also called for the
removal of the police commissioner
who, like the prime minister, seemed
not to have done much to abate the
conflict (P I M, June 2000, 12). 
The expulsion of the prime minis-
ter instilled fear in the capital. Later
in the month there was a mass
“release” of prisoners from Rove
prison. Soon foreign nationals began
leaving the country. Australians, New
Zealanders, and Canadians were
evacuated by h m as Tobruk (SS, 4 July
2000, 6). Many Solomon Islanders
found this confusing, if not amusing.
It was clear from the start that the
foreigners were not the target. It was
a row between Solomon Islanders. 
On 30 June an election was held 
to choose a new prime minister.
Three candidates, Manasseh Sogavare ,
Bishop Leslie Boseto, and former
prime minister Billy Hilly stood. The
first two were from Choiseul, and
Billy Hilly from Western Province. He
later decided to withdraw. In a close
election, Manasseh Sogavare emerged
as the new prime minister, with 23
votes to Bishop Boseto’s 21 (SS, 30
June 2000, 8–9). 
From the start, Sogavare was clear.
His new government would concen-
trate on “regaining peace.” It would
strive for a cease-fire, followed by the
signing of a peace agreement, surren-
der of arms, and then the return of
police to their normal duties of main-
taining law and order. Compensation
demands would be addressed, not
from legalistic concerns, but by using
Melanesian perspectives of “conflict
resolution” (SS, 11 July 2000, 3). 
The Isatabu Freedom Movement
lost no time in contesting the legiti-
macy and legality of the election,
which they alleged was undemocratic
because it was carried out under
duress. The Isatabu Freedom Move-
ment had learned that, because of fear
for their security, six members of the
former prime minister’s team were
unable to attend and vote. To accept
the result of such an election would
be a mockery of democratic principles
and processes. The Isatabu Freedom
Movement decided to refuse any deal-
ings with the new government (SS, 5
July 2000, 4). 
S o g a v a re re t o rt ed t h at t he g o v e rn o r-
general had given members of parlia-
ment plenty of time to attend. The
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election itself was carried out in a
proper democratic manner without
intimidation. “I was democratically
elected,” Sogavare declared (SS, 5 July
2000, 4). But the election for a new
prime minister was held after the ille-
gal ouster of Bartholomew Ulufa‘alu,
a fact that should not be easily erased
from the “national memory.”
As time goes on, crime increases,
affecting the country in many ways,
particularly national investments. A
vessel of Solomon Taiyo, the biggest
fishing company in the country, was
raided. Three armed men boarded a
pole-line fishing boat in Maravovo
Lagoon and forced the captain to take
them to Honiara (SS, 1 Aug 2000, 1).
Solomon Taiyo decided to suspend
operations in August. It was further
alleged that lives, safety, and the secu-
rity of its employees and property had
been threatened by militants (SS, 23
Jan 2001, 1). The government would
just have to take control of the opera-
tion.
In early July a more heinous human
atrocity was perpetrated on the weak-
est in society. Gunmen walked into
the national referral hospital and shot
dead two patients who were members
of the Isatabu Freedom Movement
(SS, 11 July 2000, 1). The killings were
in retaliation for other murders. 
Later in August, a group of men 
in camouflage uniform forced their
way into Honiara Casino and stole
s i$100,000 (SS, 29 Aug 2000, 1). The
mid-afternoon incident highlighted
the immediate and critical need for
law and order in the capital. On 5
O c t o b er, a prominent furn i t u re factory
was burnt. The owner, one of the few
successful Solomon Islands business-
m e n, lost millions. L a t er in N o v e m b er,
the owner of the Placemaker Building
lost it to arson. Andrew Nori’s Bridge
Law Firm was housed there. The per-
petrator sought protection in police
custody, but members of the Malaita
Eagle Force forced their way in and
shot him.
Due to damage, the reopening of
the Gold Ridge mine was delayed.
Resource owners have decided to
revise the mining agreement, claiming
that they were not adequately com-
pensated under the previous agree-
ment. As the member of parliament
responsible for that area explained,
the returns to his people were severely
underestimated. There were more
gold reserves than had been projected
(SS, 24 Nov 2000, 5). Resource own-
ers also claimed that compensation
ought to be paid for the tailing-dam
area, timber trees, taboo sites, and
loss of income from alluvial mining.
Furthermore, former i f m members
demanded s i$120,000 from the mine
for providing security during the eth-
nic crisis. As Patteson Tara explained,
“without our presence, Gold Ridge
Mining Ltd could have lost everything
because some have decided to burn
down the whole site” (SS, 30 Nov
2000, 6). 
Although other provinces expre s s e d
interest in becoming independent
states, the Malaita premier committed
the province to remaining part of a
united Solomon Islands. During a
Malaita Leaders Conference, he called
on Malaita people to be more self-
reliant. He called on other provinces
to understand the position of his peo-
ple, adding that “if we have done you
wrong forgive us, and we will do our
best to bring peace once again in Solo-
m o n Islands” (SS, 17 Aug 2000, 1).
As the conflict dragged on, a num-
ber of provinces saw an opportunity
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to declare statehood. Choiseul and
Western Provinces declared their
statehood, signaling disapproval of
the provincial system of government.
They wanted a system that devolves
more functions to the provinces, and
state government was their choice (SS,
6 July 2000, 7). Makira Province also
indicated its preference for state
autonomy. Even Temotu Province in
the Eastern Solomons had an interest
in state government. Despite this
enthusiasm, there were disagreements.
Some said that the size and popula-
tion of some provinces would make it
politically and economically unwise
for them to separate (SS, 1 7 Aug 2 0 0 0 ,
4). Some suggested that public educa-
tion was needed so that people would
well understand the decision they
would be making (SS, 24 Aug 2000,
5). Others mentioned that state gov-
ernment alone would be inadequate.
Solomon Islanders need to address
issues such as land tenure, migration
and mobility, and the need to main-
tain unity and build a sense of nation-
alism through education (SS, 30 Aug
2000, 6). Finally, one mature writer
summarized most people’s aspirations:
to achieve the “ultimate goal of living
together in harmony” (SS, 8 Sep 2000,
5).
The peace process was ongoing,
even at the height of the crisis. The
government and the churches have
been deeply involved. As part of its
ongoing contribution toward peace,
the Solomon Islands Christian Associ-
ation organized occasional church
services “for all religions to come
together to pray for peace.” Some
churches also declared twenty-one
days of national humiliation, prayer,
and fasting. During that time, all
mature Christians in all churches 
were asked to abstain from one or
two meals each day and devote their
time to prayer (SS, 15 Aug 2000, 5).
The National Peace Conference
called on all parties to assist in the
restoration of peace and normalcy to
the country, for the unity of Solomon
Islands as one country, and for the
upholding of democratic principles.
Communities, women, nongovern-
ment organizations, and churches
were urged to be proactive partici-
pants in peace activities (SS, 29 Aug
2000, 1).
The Solomon Islands Christian
Association continued to be concern e d
with the increasing break-ins in the
capital. The property of non-Melane-
sian ethnic groups was targeted dur-
ing the social unrest. The Peace Office
also reiterated the need to restore law
and order: “restoring the rule of law
is an immediate priority in the peace
process” (SS, 31 Aug 2000, 1).
Mention must be made of the
extraordinary patience, bravery, and
selflessness displayed by Solomon
Islands women in brokering peace,
long before their menfolk embraced
it. The women slowly brought the two
warring sides to “see” their common
humanity. The women started with
food, the basic but most fundamental
c o m m o n a l i t y. B rushing aside fear, v e ry
early on 1 August thirty-eight Guadal-
canal women walked to an m e f
bunker waving a white flag. To their
surprise, m e f members not only met
them but escorted them to town to do
their shopping (SS, 2 Aug 2000, 3). In
a big way, that began the process of
peacemaking.
Even before the Townsville Peace
Agreement was signed, optimism and
hopes were high. Included on the
t e a ms re p re s e n t i ng t h e w a rring gro u p s ,
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especially the Isatabu Freedom Move-
ment, were people the former govern-
ment should have engaged right from
the beginning. The Malaita Eagle
Force had their leading attorney,
Andrew Nori, as their spokesman.
This time, the Isatabu Freedom Move-
ment engaged their dynamic academic,
Tarcisius Tara, as their spokesman. It
was obvious that these were two peo-
ple who were not only well respected
but among the most well-educated
and experienced Solomon Islanders.
Unlike previous peace agreements, this
time hopes were high for a lasting
peace. And lasting it was.
The thirty-page agreement, among
other things, narrated the roots of the
ethnic tension and how it spread, the
failures of past peace accords, and the
attempts of governments in search of
lasting solutions. There is provision
for the granting of amnesty condi-
tional to the surrender of arms and
ammunition and demilitarization on
Guadalcanal and in other provinces
(SS, 18 Oct 2000, 6). On arriving
home, Andrew Nori declared that the
“war” on Guadalcanal was over. “As
far as the m ef–Joint Operation is
concerned, the war on Guadalcanal 
is over. I have said this in a telephone
interview in Australia and I repeat it
again here. Everyone in the Solomon
Islands should be happy about this
agreement. The i f m delegation to the
talks is also satisfied with the agree-
ment” (SS, 17 Oct 2000, 1).
“Peace has come, war has gone.
Solomon Islands is heading on the
r i g ht p a t h.” T h at was the j oy e x p re s s e d
by General Secretary of the Develop-
ment Services Exchange Casper Fa‘a-
sala (SS, 20 Oct 2000, 3). Rintu Taloi-
fai wrote, “no country in the world
had entered into fierce fighting and in
less than a week were hugging each
other, crying with tears of joy, hand-
shaking, . . . celebrating peace
together.” The Isatabu Freedom
Movement and the Malaita Eagle
Force combined in a celebration that
extended along the Honiara road
from White River to Gold Ridge, the
Central Development Corporation,
and the Balasuna area, and lasted for
three days. It laid the ground for for-
giveness, genuine respect, and mutual
trust for members of both sides (SS, 3
Nov 2000, 4).
On 18 December 2000 the national
parliament passed a bill granting
amnesty to former militants. Mem-
bers of both the Malaita Eagle Force
and the Isatabu Freedom Movement,
the Joint Military Force and advisers
are all covered. But the granting of
amnesty was subject to conditions:
first, all weapons and ammunition
and stolen property in the custody of
militant groups must be surrendered
and returned to the International
Peace Monitoring Team within the
period specified in the peace agree-
ment; second, criminal acts commit-
ted during the conflict were qualified
under clause 3 of the bill. However,
the minister of police, who introduced
the bill, was cautious: “We have gone
through the most trying times in our
nation’s existence. It is not for me to
judge whether what had happened is
right or wrong. I shall leave that to
others, to history and to God. . . .
What is important now is to learn
from what happened and work hard
together to ensure that this situation
does not revisit the Solomon Islands
in the future” (SS, 19 Dec 2000, 1).
The statement received a backlash
from Amnesty International head-
quarters in London, among other
556 the contemporary pacific • fall 2001
international organizations, which
described the blanket immunity for
crimes and human rights abuses com-
mitted in two years of ethnic conflict
as “a black day for human rights. . . .
Impunity for torture, rape and killing
of civilians, including children, is an
outrage and contributes nothing to
lasting peace or reconciliation.”
Compensation was a critical and
foremost issue for reconciliation in
the twenty-two-month conflict. To
be sure, the formation of the Malaita
Eagle Force occurred after the former
Ulufa‘alu government did not respond
to claims for compensation by the
Malaita people aff e c t ed. On the h m as
Tobruk, a substantial compensation
payment was made. Some s i$6 mil-
lion was paid to Malaita Province and
another s i$3 million to Guadalcanal
Province (SS, 10 July 2000, 2). 
However, compensation claims
appear to have been inflated and
complicated in terms of righting 
past wrongs on the one hand and 
the temptation to make a “fast buck”
given the “broad” goodwill of the
government in its desire to achieve
lasting peace. 
Toward the end of the year, it was
obvious that government coffers were
straining to keep up with multiple
payments of one form of compensa-
tion or another. The government was
therefore forced to seek monetary
assistance from anywhere possible. It
decided to ask the Republic of China
(Taiwan) for $300 million—$175 mil-
lion in grant assistance and $129 mil-
lion in the form of a loan. The main
reason for such a desperate move was
the need to meet commitments under
the Townsville Peace Agreement (SS,
30 Oct 2000, 3). In early November,
Solomon Islands opened an embassy
office in Taipei to galvanize diplo-
matic relations between the two
countries. 
Equally fortuitous, the Solomon
Islands received a s ta b e x allocation
from the European Union to the tune
of $200 million. Commenting on the
occasion, a huge relief in terms of
development assistance, Minister for
National Planning and Development
Michael Maena said, “We have been
waiting for this day somewhat impa-
tiently and also eager to realize the
beginning of a new chapter of rela-
tionship between EU and Solomon
Islands government. The transfer is
signed at no better time than now
when the government is desperate to
have assistance from its kind develop-
ment partners.” In December, the
Sogavare government sought $62.2
million in its Supplementary Appro-
priation Bill 2000. Again, most of this
was to meet the costs of Townsville
commitments and the peace process
(SS, 14 Dec 2000, 6).
After rebounding from a twenty-
two-month conflict that almost sunk
the country’s polity and economy, the
Sogavare government received recog-
nition and support from outside and
respect from inside for its tenacity
and diligence. At the beginning of a
new millennium, the nation of Solo-
mon Islands seems to have just
begun—again. 
john moffat fugui
R e f e re n c e s
P I M, Pacific Islands Monthly. Suva.
SS, Solomon Star. Weekly. Honiara. 
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Va n uat u
The year 2000 was generally stable
for the Vanuatu government, especially
when compared to the governance
situation in neighboring Melanesian
countries. Somewhat surprisingly per-
haps, given the previous instability in
Vanuatu politics and the difficulty of
successfully operating a coalition 
government, the five-party coalition
formed at the end of 1999 under the
leadership of Barak Sope has re m a i n e d
in power. Various rumors circulated
that a change in parliament would
occur. These included rumors that
ministerial posts would be reallocated
in contravention of the coalition
memorandum of agreement (VW, 22
Jan 2000; TP, 14 June 2000), that a
motion of no-confidence action was
to be tabled by the opposition (VW,
7 Oct 2000), and that the Vanua‘aku
Party had offered to form a coalition
with the Union of Moderate Parties
and thereby change the government
(VW, 2 Sept 2000). However, none of
the rumors amounted to anything and
no changes to parliament occurred.
There was some factionalism and
infighting within the major parties,
but none of the wrangling has had
any significant impact on Vanuatu’s
political scene.
Although the government was
largely stable, progress on the Com-
prehensive Reform Program has been
somewhat erratic. A number of re v i e w
boards were established in key areas,
including decentralization and land
administration. The Decentralization
Review Commission, whose role is to
“ensure that the fruit of c r p is shared
down to the rural areas,” has been
actively engaged in consultation
throughout Vanuatu since July and 
is expected to make recommendations
on decentralization by mid-2001 (VW,
22 July 2000). Land dispute adminis-
tration has long been a problem due
to inactive and inappropriate island
courts and an appeal structure that
brings customary disputes to the
Supreme Court. After two months of
consultations in mid-2000, the team
responsible for reviewing the land
dispute system has recommended the
creation of a dispute resolution sys-
tem that is more appropriate to cus-
tom than is the current system. Draft
legislation has been written, and, if
passed, will see the creation of village-
level lands tribunals, composed of
people who are recognized as being
knowledgeable about custom (VW,
28 Dec 2000).
A third area where review began 
in 2000 is revenue collection. The
Revenue Strategy Committee was
established in November and will, in
accordance with the Comprehensive
Reform Program, primarily consider
options for widening the tax base
(VW, 11 Nov 2000). However, this
revenue review seems to be driven
more by concern about Vanuatu’s
tax-haven status than by concern for
achieving the targets established by
the Comprehensive Reform Program.
Recent agitation by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (oecd) on unfair competition
from tax havens (a seemingly hypo-
critical attack on competition by
countries who usually champion com-
petition in the form of free trade) is
creating considerable pressure on
countries to reconsider their revenue
bases (p ir, 13 Mar 2000). While
Vanuatu’s tax base has not yet been
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modified in the face of oecd pressure,
it is a member of a joint Common-
wealth and oecd Working Group on
cross-border tax issues that has been
set up because of concerns about tax
h a v e n s (S a m oa O b s e rv e r, 30 J a n 2001).
It remains to be seen whether the out-
comes of the Revenue Strategy Com-
mittee are in any way influenced by
international anti-tax-haven pressures.
These anti-tax-haven pressures are
at least in part driven by fears that
small open economies such as Vanu-
atu’s may be used for money launder-
ing. Vanuatu has responded to accusa-
tions that its open economy can be
misused for money l a u n d e r i ng by p a s s-
ing the Financial Transactions Report-
ing Act, which establishes a Financial
Intelligence Unit. This act re q u i res that
all suspicious transactions involving
foreign currency be reported to the
new Financial Intelligence Unit who
can then investigate reports or share
information with the relevant authori-
ties (VW, 26 Aug 2000).
Other significant acts passed in
2000 include the Nurses Act, which
requires the establishment of a Nurses
Council to regulate the profession in
Vanuatu; the Judicial Services and
C o u rts Act, which is aimed at impro v-
ing standards within Vanuatu’s judi-
cial system by prescribing minimum
qualification standards for justices;
the Interactive Gaming Act, which
allows for the establishment of inter-
net casinos in Vanuatu, an activity
that will hopefully generate significant
government revenue; and the Copy-
right and Related Rights Act, which
was introduced largely in order to
meet the standards of the World
Trade Organization.
Although good governance reform
was promoted by the government in
2000 by these activities, a number 
of government-created setbacks also
occurred. In March parliament passed
the Leadership Entitlement Act, which
provides the president, the prime min-
ister, and the chair of the National
Council of Chiefs a pension of 20 per-
cent of their salary when they leave
office. The fiscal irresponsibility of this
act was opposed, but Prime Minister
Barak Sope justified it on the gro u n d s
of needing to reward and honor lead-
ers for their work. At the time, Sope
also stated that in the future parlia-
ment would amend the act so that it
also applied to members of parliament
and the judiciary (VW, 25 Mar 2000).
The Parliament (Members Expenses
and Allowances) Amendment Act was
also passed during the same session.
This act increased members’ salaries
from 120,000 vatu per month to
166,000 vatu, backdated to 1 Jan-
uary 2 0 0 0 (TP, 25 Mar 2 0 0 0) .
The second legislative action to
shake the good governance agenda
was the passage of two Private Mem-
bers Bills introduced into parliament
in March by Tanna member and gov-
ernment backbencher Iaris Naunun.
The first of these pieces of legislation
aimed to amend the Public Service
Act 1998 by deleting provisions that
prohibit political interference in the
operation of the public service. In
particular, the amendment would
allow for director generals and other
public servants to be removed by a
directive of the prime minister. The
second aimed to amend the Govern-
ment Act 1998 by removing require-
ments that any submission to the
Council of Ministers involving legal
issues be first approved by the attor-
ney general. Similarly, it removed the
requirement that the director general
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of Finance and Economic Manage-
ment first approve any submission to
the Council of Ministers involving
financial matters (VW, 1 Apr 2000).
These bills were approved by parlia-
ment on 10 April then forwarded to
the president of Vanuatu, Father John
Bani, for ratification. With doubts
about the constitutionality of the bills,
Father Bani refused to sign them and
instead referred them to the Supreme
Court (VW, 13 May 2000). The
alleged unconstitutionality of the bills
stemmed from article 60(4) of the
Constitution, which reads “The [Pub-
lic Service] Commission shall not be
subject to the direction or control of
any other person or body in the exer-
cise of its functions.” In August, Act-
ing Chief Justice Lunabeck ruled that
giving the prime minister the right to
fire public servants by issue of direc-
tives was in breach of that article. The
remaining content of both bills was
ruled constitutional, and both have
now been promulgated (TP, 2 Sept
2000).
Other notable incidents that nega-
tively affected the government’s repu-
tation include misbehavior by then
Deputy Prime Minister Stanley Regi-
nald, and the appointment of Amare n-
dra Nand Ghosh as Vanuatu’s hon-
orary consul to Thailand. Reginald’s
drunken behavior attracted media
attention twice in 2000. In March he
assaulted two people and punched his
hand through a glass door in a bar in
Port Vila (TP, 1 Apr 2000). The sec-
ond incident, in Luganville, involved
threats to security guards and man-
agement when Reginald was asked to
leave a club at closing time. It was
alleged that one of Reginald’s guards
assaulted a security officer and threat-
ened him with a pistol (VW, 5 Aug
2000). These incidents resulted in an
ombudsman’s report recommending
that Prime Minister Sope remove
Reginald from any ministerial posi-
tions. The report also urged the police
to investigate the complaints and lay
charges as required (TP, 14 Oct 2000).
Although no criminal charges have
been laid against him because of these
actions, Reginald resigned as deputy
prime minister at the end of August
and was replaced by James Bule (TP,
30 Aug 2000).
Ghosh’s appointment as honorary
consul for Vanuatu in Thailand
occurred in April, soon after he had
given 10 million vatu to Vanuatu for
disaster relief. He was also awarded
h o n o r a ry citizenship, as one must hold
citizenship in order to be a consul for
Vanuatu (VW, 8 Apr 2000). The oppo-
sition objected to this action, feeling
that Ghosh had bought himself a
diplomatic passport. Both Leader of
the Opposition Edward Natapei and
Deputy Leader of the Opposition
Willie Jimmy expressed concern that
the actions of the government would
create an environment whereby peo-
ple could “buy” the government. This
concern arose out of Ghosh’s steadily
expanding business interests in Vanu-
atu, including an offshore bank, and
from his allegedly close friendship
with Dinh van Than, president of the
National United Party (VW, 29 Apr
2000). The government, however,
denied that Ghosh’s appointment was
a political decision, stating that “Van-
uatu, as a member of the Common-
wealth, should have consulates in
other member countries” (VW, 8 Apr
2000). In November further news sto-
ries about Ghosh surfaced, with the
Trading Post running a headline that
read “Ghosh Accused of u s$12m
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Fraud in Singapore” (TP, 22 Nov
2000). Ghosh responded to these alle-
gations immediately by explaining
that the Singapore incident involved 
a dispute between banks, and did not
involve him personally (TP, 25 Nov
2000). Soon after, he presented the
government with a ruby that is
allegedly worth us$174 million. This
ruby was stated to be a gift to Vanu-
atu “to help the country so that it
could be used as collateral to get
financial assistance” (TP, 6 Dec 2000).
Subsequently, questions were raised
by a gem expert about the true worth
of the stone. The question of what Mr
Ghosh is receiving from the govern-
ment in return for this gift has also
been raised by skeptical observers 
(TP, 27 Dec 2000).
The relationship between Ghosh
and the Vanuatu government becomes
more disquieting when events of early
2001 are considered. On 19 January
2001, Marc Neil Jones, editor of the
Trading Post, was deported from
Vanuatu for publishing “negative and
baseless” stories about the relation-
ship between Ghosh and the govern-
ment (p i r , 20 Jan 2001). Jones
returned to Vanuatu after two days,
following an interim order by Acting
Chief Justice Lunabeck that allowed
him back into the country until the
legality of his deportation could be
resolved in court. After further threats
by the government a customary rec-
onciliation ceremony was performed
between Jones and the government.
This ceremony, which was prompted
in part by a public outcry against the
government’s actions, appears to have
settled the dispute.
This attack on press freedom does
not come entirely as a surprise. At the
end of 1999 Sope made statements
directed at opposition leaders, jour-
nalists, and the public to the effect
that conspiracy and treason are crimi-
nal offenses with a life sentence, and
news stories that show the govern-
ment in a bad light can be considered
treasonous (TP, 15 Dec 1999). Signals
that media freedom in Vanuatu was
under threat continued to appear with
regularity throughout 2000. In Policy
2000: Government of the Republic of
Vanuatu Statement to the Nation, it
was stated that “the Government
recognises and supports media free-
doms as outlined in the Constitution
and will promote these principles.
However, the media must be a con-
structive contributor to Vanuatu soci-
ety. Rumours in the media can be very
counter-productive to the nation not
only internally but internationally”
(my italics). Shortly after this state-
ment was released the Trading Post
was warned by Minister for Tourism
and Ni-Vanuatu Business John Alick
“not to publish any article relating 
to the m v Latua and its passengers.”
The sinking of the m v Latua in 1999
resulted in a Commission of Inquiry,
which released a public report that
the Trading Post had quoted in a
front-page article, an action that
prompted Alick’s written warning to
the newspaper. The Trading Post filed
an official complaint to the ombuds-
man over Alick’s actions. Although
publicly agreeing that Alick’s actions
were in breach of constitutional pro-
visions on the freedom of expression,
the ombudsman declined to initiate an
investigation into the matter (VW, 29
Jan 2000).
In April further government com-
plaints were raised about the Trading
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Post, this time relating to its reporting
of the Private Members Bills issue. In
this particular instance the newspaper,
quoting former Prime Minister Don-
ald Kalpokas, ran a headline reading
“Government Celebrate CRP’s
Funeral” (TP, 12 Apr 2000). The min-
ister for the Comprehensive Reform
Program expressed concern that the
media was misusing its privileges.
Minister for Energy Carlot Korman
was very outspoken on the allegedly
misleading nature of the headline,
stating that “we never made any cele-
bration as stated by Trading Post.
Now people overseas will say that in
Vanuatu they make celebration when-
ever there is a funeral and we know
that it is not true.” When the govern-
ment called for an urgent debate of
the Trading Post report, Leader of 
the Opposition Edward Natapei ques-
tioned the need, saying, “I believe that
the Trading Post front-page headline
touched you on the Government side”
(VW, 15 Apr 2000). In this instance,
although no warning to the Trading
Post resulted, the government inten-
tion to limit press freedom was fairly
apparent. Not long afterward the gov-
ernment, in a press statement, gave 
a general warning to the media “to
always maintain balanced reporting”
(VW, 6 May 2000).
The government attack on freedom
of expression has caused concern to
proponents of the good governance
agenda. However, it appears that the
local and international outcry over
the deportation of Jones may be a
sufficient reminder to the government
that constitutional rights cannot be
breached without just cause.
Possibly the largest issue for the
government in 2000 has been that of
law and order. The first part of the
year was dominated by Operesen
Klinim Not 2000. This police opera-
tion was prompted by deteriorating
order in Luganville, Santo. Although
efforts had been made to use the cus-
tomary authority of local chiefs to
maintain order, over Christmas and
New Year a number of violent and
destabilizing incidents occurred, such
as the open display of guns and
threats at gunpoint to businesspeople.
This law-and-order problem has been
growing in Luganville for some time
and appears to be largely caused by
unemployed and disaffected youth.
After the incidents over the Christmas
period, the police decided to tackle
the problem and mounted an opera-
tion that saw a number of people
arrested and charged with various
crimes, including theft, assault, and
unlawful entry (VW, 15 Jan 2000).
Some, including the chiefs of the 
area, who have been losing authority
in the existing atmosphere of lawless-
ness, applauded the police operation.
However, very soon after the police
campaign commenced a number of
complaints were made about heavy-
handed police behavior, such as using
guns unnecessarily during arrests and
keeping people in custody without
charge for undue lengths of time (VW,
5 Feb 2000; TP, 26 Jan 2000). It is
unclear how many of the approxi-
mately 200 people arrested in Opere-
sen Klinim Not were charged with any
offense or subsequently convicted,
although a number of prosecutions
were subsequently dismissed due to
errors in prosecution procedure (TP, 9
Feb 2000). A group of about 50 indi-
viduals arrested during the operation,
who claim to have been badly beaten
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while in police custody, held for 
more than twenty-four hours without
charge, or held in unsanitary cells is
seeking compensation from the police.
The aggrieved individuals may pro-
ceed to court with their complaints
and are filing for damages of 100
million vatu (TP, 27 May 2000).
The focus on problems with the
police in Luganville continued when it
was revealed that files relating to the
prosecution of a rape incident went
missing from the prosecutor’s office.
Prisoners, including one who was a
suspect in the rape case, had been
taken to clean the office around the
time the files went missing. The com-
missioner of police, who described the
i n c i d e n t a s “a sign of total n e g l i g e n c e,”
revealed that other incidents of miss-
ing files resulting in no prosecution
had occurred (VW, 4 Mar 2000).
The perception of a growing lack
of respect for, and effectiveness of,
law in Vanuatu was compounded by
the Council of Ministers decision to
release all prisoners, including people
convicted for rape, serious assault, and
homicide, on New Year’s Eve 1999.
Within two days two of the re l e a s e d
prisoners were returned to jail for
committing further crimes (VW, 15 Jan
2000). Not until the middle of the
year was the most serious ramification
of the decision felt, however. In early
June a businessman, Justin West, was
killed by one of the released prisoners
who had broken into West’s home to
steal the keys to his shop. He was
rapidly apprehended and subsequently
sentenced to fourteen years’ imprison-
ment. We s t ’s death renewed public
c a l ls f or p o l i t i c i a ns to e x e rc i se re s t r a i n t
in decisions to release prisoners, a
message that has so far been heeded.
The death of Justin West also served
to h i g h l i g ht t he g ro w i ng l a w - a n d - o rd e r
p roblem in Port Vila. Police there have
mounted a number of operations
aimed at clearing the backlog of
incomplete investigations and re d u c i n g
alcohol-induced public disturbances
(VW, 19 A ug 2 0 00). Perhaps the most
interesting response to the issue has
been from the Vatveve Kaea Council
of Chiefs in N o rth Pentecost. T h i s
council, because it “hates to see our
people who are without jobs c a u s i n g
p roblems around [Port Vila],” sent a
paramount chief to Port Vila to ord e r
unemployed people from the council’s
area back to Pentecost (VW, 8 July
2000). 
Increasingly, politicians and the
general public are becoming concern e d
about escalating crime. Patterns of
behavior that were notable in Papua
New Guinea at the beginning of its
law-and-order problem are now being
noted in Vanuatu. Increasing urban
migration, youth unemployment, and
inadequate law enforcement leading
to confidence among criminals are all
becoming evident (TP, 28 Oct 2000).
Ethnic tensions in Port Vila arising
because of land use disputes among
traditional owners also contribute to
the problem (TP, 24 June 2000). The
increasing presence of guns in Vanu-
atu, which in part prompted Operesen
Klinim Not, is another cause for con-
cern. This issue was highlighted by
police purchases of fifty Berretta hand-
guns through a gun dealer in Vanuatu
in September, accompanied by rumors
that the p o l i ce w e re w a n t i n g to a c q u i re
an arsenal of m16 assault rifles (TP, 13
Sept 2000). This police action has led
to public fears that, as in Solomon
Islands and Papua New Guinea, police
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weapons may be stolen by criminals
and used in violent crime. Although
this may seem an alarmist opinion,
there is no denying that the mainte-
nance of law and order is becoming
an increasingly significant issue for
urban Vanuatu. From the experiences
of our Melanesian neighbors, it seems
that unless Vanuatu takes steps to
address this issue now, the bre a k d o w n
of law and order could become a
defining issue in the development 
of Vanuatu in the future.
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